The Washington Consensus was [...] fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, (maintaining) a competitive exchange rate, liberalizing trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), privatization, and deregulation

the insistence that all developing states follow their liberal instruction sheets to get rich, the so-called Washington Consensus approach to development

China’s economic development suggests the possibility of a Chinese twenty-first century, with a ‘Beijing Consensus’ succeeding the ‘Washington Consensus’.

Kabila’s government had no independent access to capital markets: the only way of securing credit lay through the IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme, where debt relief was tied to the usual requirements of the Washington Consensus

The so-called Washington Consensus, confidently enforced by the IMF, World Bank, and other economic institutions since the 1970s, has been comprehensively challenged from within the ranks of its own practitioners.

we can see how this “structural adjustment” of public finances has played out rather badly in most places where the Washington Consensus was implemented, not least in Washington itself

The US once enjoyed near-hegemony over Latin America, a position initially enshrined by the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and, in modern times, the so-called 'Washington Consensus'.

Marketize, privatize, deregulate: the Washington Consensus mantra dominated policy in the developing world for a quarter century. For most the recipe was a disaster.

Still, there are differences between the “Washington Consensus” policies of the past and those advanced by the brics. For one, China does not have a neoliberal economy