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90

Prognosis

Un faux-filet, peut-être?

10
terms
6
notes

Žižek, S. (2015). Prognosis. In Žižek, S. Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism. Penguin Books, pp. 90-142

96

[...] the 'working class' is ultimately an empirical category designating a part of society (wage workers), while the proletariat is more a formal category designing the 'part of no-part' of the social body, the point of its symptomal torsion or, as Marx put it, the un-reason within reason--the rational structure of asociety. [...]

ok i dont really know what he's trying to say here. recording it cus i should find out the difference at some point

—p.96 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

[...] the 'working class' is ultimately an empirical category designating a part of society (wage workers), while the proletariat is more a formal category designing the 'part of no-part' of the social body, the point of its symptomal torsion or, as Marx put it, the un-reason within reason--the rational structure of asociety. [...]

ok i dont really know what he's trying to say here. recording it cus i should find out the difference at some point

—p.96 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

referring to the Pauli exclusion principle (the assertion that no two fermions can have the same quantum number)

99

the Paulinian idea of passing from Law to love

—p.99 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

the Paulinian idea of passing from Law to love

—p.99 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago
100

The difference between liberalism and the radical Left is that, although they refer to the same three elements (the liberal centre, the populist Right, and the radical Left), they locate them in a different topology: for the liberal centre, the radical Left and Right are two forms of the same 'totalitarian' excess, while for the Left, the only true alternative is the one between itself and the liberal mainstream, with the populist 'radical' Right as nothing but the symptom of liberalism's inability to deal with the Leftist threat. When we hear today's politicians or ideologists offering us a choice between liberal freedom and fundamentalist oppression, and triumphantly asking a (purely rhetorical) question 'Do you want women to be excluded from public life and deprived of their elementary rights? Do you want everyone who mocks religion to be punished by death?', what should make us suspicious is the very self-evidence of the answer--who would ever want that? The problem is that such a simplistic liberal universalism lost its innocence long ago. This is why, for a true Leftist, the conflict between liberal permissiveness and fundamentalism is ultimately a false conflict--a vicious cycle of two poles generating and presupposing each other. One should take a Hegelian step back and question the very measure from which fundamentalism appears in all its horror. [...]

—p.100 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

The difference between liberalism and the radical Left is that, although they refer to the same three elements (the liberal centre, the populist Right, and the radical Left), they locate them in a different topology: for the liberal centre, the radical Left and Right are two forms of the same 'totalitarian' excess, while for the Left, the only true alternative is the one between itself and the liberal mainstream, with the populist 'radical' Right as nothing but the symptom of liberalism's inability to deal with the Leftist threat. When we hear today's politicians or ideologists offering us a choice between liberal freedom and fundamentalist oppression, and triumphantly asking a (purely rhetorical) question 'Do you want women to be excluded from public life and deprived of their elementary rights? Do you want everyone who mocks religion to be punished by death?', what should make us suspicious is the very self-evidence of the answer--who would ever want that? The problem is that such a simplistic liberal universalism lost its innocence long ago. This is why, for a true Leftist, the conflict between liberal permissiveness and fundamentalism is ultimately a false conflict--a vicious cycle of two poles generating and presupposing each other. One should take a Hegelian step back and question the very measure from which fundamentalism appears in all its horror. [...]

—p.100 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

(adjective) of, relating to, or characteristic of Hegel, his philosophy, or his dialectic method / (noun) a follower of Hegel; an adherent of Hegelianism

101

One should take a Hegelian step back and question the very measure from which fundamentalism appears in all its horror.

—p.101 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

One should take a Hegelian step back and question the very measure from which fundamentalism appears in all its horror.

—p.101 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

(noun) a change or variation occurring in the course of something; successive, alternating, or changing phases or conditions, as of life or fortune; ups and downs

101

don't the recent vicissitudes of Muslim fundamentalism confirm Walter Benjamin's old insight that 'every rise of Fascism bears witness to a failed revolution'?

—p.101 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

don't the recent vicissitudes of Muslim fundamentalism confirm Walter Benjamin's old insight that 'every rise of Fascism bears witness to a failed revolution'?

—p.101 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago
104

This is why every revolution has to be repeated. It is only after the first enthusiastic unity disintegrates that true universality can be formulated, a universality no longer sustained by imaginary illusions. It is only after the initial unity of the people falls apart that the real work begins, the hard work of assuming all the implications of the struggle for an egalitarian and just society. It is not enough simply to get rid of the tyrant; the society which gave birth to the tyrant has to be thoroughly transformed. [...]

—p.104 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

This is why every revolution has to be repeated. It is only after the first enthusiastic unity disintegrates that true universality can be formulated, a universality no longer sustained by imaginary illusions. It is only after the initial unity of the people falls apart that the real work begins, the hard work of assuming all the implications of the struggle for an egalitarian and just society. It is not enough simply to get rid of the tyrant; the society which gave birth to the tyrant has to be thoroughly transformed. [...]

—p.104 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

the philosophical attempt to describe things in terms of their apparent intrinsic purpose, directive principle, or goal, irrespective of human use or opinion

105

No wonder that genuine revolutionary moments are so rare: no teleology guarantees them; they hinge on whether there is a political agent able to seize a (contingent, unpredictable) opening.

—p.105 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

No wonder that genuine revolutionary moments are so rare: no teleology guarantees them; they hinge on whether there is a political agent able to seize a (contingent, unpredictable) opening.

—p.105 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago
108

The paradox is that, precisely because it lacks democratic legitimacy, an authoritarian regime can sometimes be more responsible towards its subjects than one that was democratically elected: since it lacks democratic legitimacy, it has to legitimize itself by providing services to the citizens, with the underlying reasoning, 'True, we are not democratically elected, but as such, since we do not have to play the game of striving for cheap popularity, we can focus on citizens' real needs.' A democratically elected government, on the contrary, can fully exert its power for the narrow private interests of its members; they already have the legitimacy provided by elections, so they don't need any further legitimization and can feel safe doing what they want--they can say to those who complain, 'You elected us, now it's too late.'

that's of course assuming they don't focus on their own needs, but interesting point

—p.108 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

The paradox is that, precisely because it lacks democratic legitimacy, an authoritarian regime can sometimes be more responsible towards its subjects than one that was democratically elected: since it lacks democratic legitimacy, it has to legitimize itself by providing services to the citizens, with the underlying reasoning, 'True, we are not democratically elected, but as such, since we do not have to play the game of striving for cheap popularity, we can focus on citizens' real needs.' A democratically elected government, on the contrary, can fully exert its power for the narrow private interests of its members; they already have the legitimacy provided by elections, so they don't need any further legitimization and can feel safe doing what they want--they can say to those who complain, 'You elected us, now it's too late.'

that's of course assuming they don't focus on their own needs, but interesting point

—p.108 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

(noun) a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being / (noun) a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of things that have existence

108

it is also an 'ontological' struggle, a struggle which concerns the thing itself, a struggle that goes on in the very heart of the protests themselves

on protests in Egypt

—p.108 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

it is also an 'ontological' struggle, a struggle which concerns the thing itself, a struggle that goes on in the very heart of the protests themselves

on protests in Egypt

—p.108 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

(lit: nobody's thing) derived from private Roman law whereby res (an object in the legal sense, anything that can be owned, even a slave, but not a subject in law such as a citizen nor land) is not yet the object of rights of any specific subject

110

Global capitalism tends to reduce the commons to res nullius which in Roman law designates anything that can be owned [...] but which is not yet the object of the rights of any specific subject--such things are considered ownerless property, 'free to be owned'.

—p.110 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

Global capitalism tends to reduce the commons to res nullius which in Roman law designates anything that can be owned [...] but which is not yet the object of the rights of any specific subject--such things are considered ownerless property, 'free to be owned'.

—p.110 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

the postulate that markets are organised most effectively by private enterprise and that the private pursuit of accumulation will generate the most common good; accomplished by opening international markets and financial networks, and downsizing the welfare state

111

there is no analytic value in blaming neoliberalism for our particular woes: today's world order is a concrete totality within which specific situations ask for specific acts

in other words, maybe neoliberalism was inevitable (as a stage we must pass through) and now all we can do is try to move past it?

—p.111 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

there is no analytic value in blaming neoliberalism for our particular woes: today's world order is a concrete totality within which specific situations ask for specific acts

in other words, maybe neoliberalism was inevitable (as a stage we must pass through) and now all we can do is try to move past it?

—p.111 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago
116

[...] the great lesson of state socialism is that the direct abolition of private property and market-regulated exchange without concrete forms of social regulation of the process of production necessarily resuscitates relations of servitude and domination. If we merely abolish the market (inclusive of market exploitation) without replacing it with a proper form of Communist organization of production and exchange, domination returns with a vengeance, and with it direct exploitation.

this is a result of analysing Ayn Rand's 'hymn to money' in Atlas Shrugged (violence, or money)

—p.116 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

[...] the great lesson of state socialism is that the direct abolition of private property and market-regulated exchange without concrete forms of social regulation of the process of production necessarily resuscitates relations of servitude and domination. If we merely abolish the market (inclusive of market exploitation) without replacing it with a proper form of Communist organization of production and exchange, domination returns with a vengeance, and with it direct exploitation.

this is a result of analysing Ayn Rand's 'hymn to money' in Atlas Shrugged (violence, or money)

—p.116 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

produce (especially literary work) by long and intensive effort

128

the pure lawless Real resists symbolic grasp, so that we should always be aware that our attempts to conceptualize it are mere semblances, defensive elucubrations

—p.128 by Slavoj Žižek
uncertain
2 years, 3 months ago

the pure lawless Real resists symbolic grasp, so that we should always be aware that our attempts to conceptualize it are mere semblances, defensive elucubrations

—p.128 by Slavoj Žižek
uncertain
2 years, 3 months ago

the part of theology concerned with death, judgment, and the final destiny of the soul and of humankind

128

rejection of the eschatological notion of the Future which Marxism inherited from the Christian tradition

—p.128 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

rejection of the eschatological notion of the Future which Marxism inherited from the Christian tradition

—p.128 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago
129

[...] Perhaps the Left should learn fully to assume the basic 'alienation' of the historical process: we cannot control the consequences of our acts--not because we are just puppets in the hand of some secret Master or Fate which pulls the strings, but for precisely the opposite reason: there is no big Other, no agent of total accountability that can take into account the consequences of our own acts. This acceptance of 'alienation' in no way entails a cynical distance; it implies a fully engaged position aware of the risks involved--there is no higher historical Necessity whose instruments we are and which guarantees the final outcome of our interventions. From this standpoint, our despair at the present deadlock appears in a new light: we have to renounce the very eschatological scheme which underlies our despair. There will never be a Left that magically transforms confused revolts and protests into one big consistent Project of Salvation; all we have is our activity, open to all the risks of contingent history. [...]

—p.129 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

[...] Perhaps the Left should learn fully to assume the basic 'alienation' of the historical process: we cannot control the consequences of our acts--not because we are just puppets in the hand of some secret Master or Fate which pulls the strings, but for precisely the opposite reason: there is no big Other, no agent of total accountability that can take into account the consequences of our own acts. This acceptance of 'alienation' in no way entails a cynical distance; it implies a fully engaged position aware of the risks involved--there is no higher historical Necessity whose instruments we are and which guarantees the final outcome of our interventions. From this standpoint, our despair at the present deadlock appears in a new light: we have to renounce the very eschatological scheme which underlies our despair. There will never be a Left that magically transforms confused revolts and protests into one big consistent Project of Salvation; all we have is our activity, open to all the risks of contingent history. [...]

—p.129 by Slavoj Žižek 2 years, 3 months ago

a category of people within the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries who held various key administrative positions in the bureaucracy running all spheres of those countries' activity

134

the most dangerous place to be at the time of the terrible 1930s purges in the Soviet Union was at the top of the nomenklatura

—p.134 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago

the most dangerous place to be at the time of the terrible 1930s purges in the Soviet Union was at the top of the nomenklatura

—p.134 by Slavoj Žižek
notable
2 years, 3 months ago