“They were freaking out,” Lehane recounted later. “I did a lot of ballot work in California, statewide ballots primarily, and I said, ‘Look, you’re on the “no” side of the ballot. The typical way you win these ballots is, you spend a bunch of money, and the no side wins eighty percent of these. There’s a pretty tried-and-true way to do these things.’ ” But Chesky wanted to see if there was a different approach. “Is there a way we can think about using this as an opportunity to rally and organize our host community and our users, our guests,” Chesky asked, according to Lehane. That conversation eventually led to the creation of the first home-sharing club. “We organized the hosts. We communicated with the guests. We had hosts who were precinct captains and going to their neighbors. When we started off, we were close to twenty points behind. We ran a pretty strong narrative that talked about the economic benefits that the city and in particular these hosts were getting. That became the template for the campaigns we started to run around the world.”
Such organizing would be an important dynamic in regulatory battles not just for Airbnb but for Uber, Lyft and other companies in what was sometimes known as the sharing economy. It’s not clear how big a difference it ultimately made in San Francisco, though. The company had also employed Lehane’s tried-and-true approach, spending more than $8 million to beat back the measure—an astonishing sum in a small city, amounting to $75 for every “no” vote. It lost by 55–45 percent. Whatever one might think about the merits of the issue, it was certainly a demonstration of the new Internet industry’s political and financial muscle.
a ballot measure led by calvin welch for banning airbnbs for < 30 days