The Oakland General Strike had ended, but the Kahn’s and Hastings workers who started it all were still on strike. The immediate result of more than one hundred thousand workers taking to the streets was simply an agreement that the city would no longer allow its police to protect strikebreakers. Yet, almost immediately, police were again escorting strikebreakers through the picket lines at Kahn’s and Hastings. Although angry at this violation of the agreement, AFL union leaders were nonetheless not about to call another general strike. What they did do was quite effective, however, in its own way.
Unlike the San Francisco General Strike a dozen years earlier, the Oakland General Strike did not usher in a new era for working people. Rather, the 1946 strike wave, including what happened in Oakland, might better be understood as a late flower of the mass militancy of the prewar period but without the politicizing environment of an economy in collapse. The differences between the two Bay Area citywide general strikes reflect the moments in which they took place. The events and elements of 1934—massive employer and police violence, the desperate and radicalized workforce, a relative vacuum where labor laws should have been—were not replicated in 1946, which featured a battle fought over different stakes—to maintain recognition for the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively, and continued respect and status for union leaders—by a larger, more stable labor movement seeking its place in the postwar order. The two strikes were very different bookends for the most dynamic period of growth in working-class consciousness and power in California history.
Here—a stone’s throw from where John Steinbeck set the events of his 1939 novel, The Grapes of Wrath—they slept, cooked their meals, and talked over what California had done to their dreams of reestablishing themselves as farmers. They also talked about Joseph DiGiorgio and as they talked they got angry. One of the first to join Local 218 was Phineas Parks, a preacher who worked in DiGiorgio’s packing sheds and who pitched in immediately for the cause. Hasiwar recalled how Parks would start the meetings, telling the workers,
My God, we need a Union! We got to stand up like men. The bosses are no more men than we are. They get into their pants just like we do, one leg at a time. These guys got so much money they buy Cadillacs so big that when they make a turn they need hinges on them.
A Bakersfield Central Labor Council committee collected and distributed over one hundred thousand dollars worth of clothes, food, and money to the strikers’ families. Much of this support arrived in caravans sent by the Los Angeles and San Francisco labor councils, including one in March 1948, with over three hundred cars and trucks. Victor Van Bourg, a teenaged apprentice painter, rode in a bus chartered by his Communist-controlled Hollywood Painters union local to the DiGiorgio picket lines. It was a formative experience for the young Van Bourg; years later, after he became an attorney, he volunteered his time doing legal work for the farmworker cause.
Teamster drivers and winery workers refused to cross Local 218 picket lines. The Retail Clerks union informed DiGiorgio that they would not handle his produce in Los Angeles, and the California State Labor Federation, AFL, contributed five hundred dollars a month to the strike and called for a consumer boycott of DiGiorgio products. The national AFL, thanks to a personal friendship between AFL president William Green and H.L. Mitchell, also pitched in, covering Hasiwar’s expenses.
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The Hollywood Film Council consisted of a group of craft unions dominated by the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE, or simply “the IA”). The IA had just emerged triumphant from a bloody two-year struggle with progressive unions over job control on Hollywood movie sets. This was a more extreme version of the traditional jurisdictional divisions encouraged by studio producers for decades between AFL building trade unions and the IA. Beginning with the successful Disney studio animators’ strike of 1941, painter’s union leader Herb Sorrell built a credible democratic union federation, the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU), as an alternative to the corrupt IA, which had been controlled by Chicago mobsters since the early 1930s.
Although the mob’s number one enforcer in Hollywood, Willie Bioff, and the IA national president, Richard Walsh, had gone to prison in 1940 along with a producer who had colluded with their money-skimming schemes, most IA Hollywood locals remained in the hands of the old guard. IA activists who had hoped for a revival of union democracy were disappointed; the meetings mostly had no quorums, a legacy of years of intimidation and shakedowns by Bioff’s associates. Studio workers interested in improving conditions turned to the Conference of Studio Unions.
Disneyland opened in summer 1955. A million eager visitors streamed in in the first seven weeks. Working families came on their days off from Bethlehem and Kaiser steel mills, from car manufacturing plants in Maywood, South Gate, and Van Nuys, from downtown Los Angeles garment factories, and from the area’s largest employer, aerospace. The other employees of “Uncle Walt”, who labored in Disney’s Burbank studios, came too, alongside the rest of the Hollywood workforce. From near and far, the children of the AFL and CIO made their pilgrimages to the spectacular new Anaheim amusement park, strolling up Main Street USA to Tomorrowland.
Four in ten members of the state’s workforce belonged to unions. In the industrial sectors, union density hovered around 50 percent. California, the third-ranking manufacturing state, led the nation in agricultural production and in international shipping. Automobile production in Los Angeles County was second only to Detroit.
Within their growing affluence, people were thinking of themselves less as “workers” in the way they understood that term in the Great Depression and more as “consumers” in a successful, middle-class society. To Waldie, whose father was an engineer at a gas company, “There was no obvious way to tell a factory worker from a business owner or a professional man when I grew up.”
Unionism, too, came to be understood differently. No longer did most labor organizations face the nagging, persistent threat of extinction. Now, some companies accepted unions as part of the cost of doing business in an American economy dependent on workers’ spending. A few forward-looking business leaders even embraced unions wholeheartedly as an advance over the bad old ways of violent class conflict. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, bankrolled by the capitalist family whose nineteenth-century forebear founded the Standard Oil empire and was notorious for a 1914 massacre of striking miners and their families in Ludlow, Colorado, issued a report in 1958 that would have startled John D. Rockefeller.
Since labor’s role in economic growth is so vital, it is important to establish and maintain an environment which will call for the most honorable, responsible, and imaginative trade union leadership. . . . Cooperation with responsible labor leadership should serve to stimulate the full contribution labor can make to growth and eliminate the forces which might take root in a strained and troubled labor movement.
NFWA and AWOC set up a system of roving pickets, with different fields picketed each day. Fifteen or twenty cars full of pickets would go to a field where a grower was attempting to use strikebreakers. Striking workers, often harassed by the growers and police, sometimes violently, would try to get the scabs to leave the fields. Remarkably, their appeals were successful much of the time in emptying the ranches of workers, who were persuaded it was in their interest to strike.
The growers, overconfident, made a mistake almost immediately. They had always been able to end strikes with small wage concessions. Soon after the strike began they raised wages to $1.40 per hour. But this time they were shocked to discover it wasn’t enough. The raise merely encouraged the strikers to believe they were being effective. Now there had to be a union contract, too.
the Delano grape harvest strike
A couple months after the strike erupted, Chavez and Huerta, on a suggestion from attorney Stewart Weinberg, initiated a crucial tactic, one that the farmworkers used to remarkable effect: a consumer grape boycott. The union called upon the public to refrain from buying grapes without a union label. Union volunteers were sent out to big cities, where they established boycott centers that organized friendly groups—unions, churches, community organizations—to not buy grapes and to publicize the boycott and pressure stores to remove grapes from their shelves.
This was not a first. The National Farm Labor Union had used the tactic with some success during the DiGiorgio strike. But the grape strike took things to a new level. Combined with the union’s public disavowal of violence, this boycott was better funded, more extensive, more organized, and more effective. For one thing, it included a secondary boycott of stores selling grapes, not simply the primary boycott of the product itself. Although part of the difficulty farmworkers faced in organizing stemmed from their exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, an advantage of being outside the law was their ability to use secondary boycotts, which had been removed from the NLRA by Taft-Hartley in 1947.
Although the upsurge of unionism among public workers was the greatest of any group of workers since the 1930s, the backgrounds and aspirations of public employees were not homogenous. Professionals and semiprofessionals whose work required lengthy, specialized training, including a college education and graduate school, such as teachers, social workers, librarians, and nurses, shared little at first glance with blue collar public employees like police and firefighters, trash collectors, school secretaries, and street maintenance and building construction workers. But what they all wanted—a greater say in how their jobs were run, better pay and benefits, and ultimately the right to bargain collectively to achieve these goals—produced enough glue to help overcome distinctions between “middle class” and “working class” occupations, and propelled a movement.