The fifth chapter also develops a leitmotif running through the others: as I have already noted, neoliberalism yielded effects very different from those imagined and sought by its architects. The reasons for this are several. There is, first, a kind of return of the repressed in neoliberalism reason—a ferocious eruption of the social and political forces that the neoliberals at once opposed, underestimated, and deformed with their dedemocratizing project. What this means is that actually existing neoliberalism now features what Sheldon Wolin characterizes as an “enraged” form of majority rule (often termed “populism” by pundits) arising from the society that neoliberals aimed to disintegrate, but failed to vanquish, and thus left without common civil norms or commitments. There is, second, neoliberalism’s accidental unleashing of the financial sector and the ways that financialization profoundly undermined neoliberal dreams of a competitive global order lightly tended by supranational institutions, on the one hand, and facilitated by states fully autonomous of economic interests and manipulation, on the other.19 Third, there are the ways that markets and morals twisted as they were submitted to the grammars and spirit of one another—that is, as morality was marketized and markets were moralized. Through this process, both became politicized as fighting creeds, thus losing the “organic, spontaneous” character and mode of organizing conduct for which Hayek and his colleagues cherished them. Finally, neoliberalism intensified the nihilism, fatalism, and rancorous resentment already present in late modern culture. Together, these developments and effects generated something radically different from the neoliberal utopia of an inegalitarian liberal order in which individuals and families would be politically pacified by markets and morals and subtended by an autonomous authoritative, but depoliticized state. Instead, neoliberalism produced a monster its founders would abhor.