[...] Eventually de Gaulle softened his opposition to the European Union, after repeated American pledges in the 1950s that France would remain Europe’s administrative center. But he would only embrace it so long as, in his own words to a visiting journalist, the European Union resembled 'a horse and carriage: Germany [being] the horse and France . . . the coachman.'

Alas, by 1963 it was clear that the horse was developing a mind of its own and the coachman was losing his grip. France’s accelerating trade deficit with Germany meant that Paris would be forced into a perpetual Sophie’s choice. Regularly go cap in hand to the IMF for permission to devalue the franc, admitting to permanent national weakness, or rely forever on the Bundesbank to print Deutsche Marks with which to buy francs, admitting to an unending dependency upon the old enemy. Either way, France’s aspirations for political and diplomatic domination of the European Union were unravelling.