Activity

[...] Value and meaning do not reside in things but are produced by the desiring forces that seize them: ‘We neither strive, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and des…

Ethics, III, 9 states that, fundamentally, it is in desire’s own investments that the valorisation of things originates

In each person, the valorisation of things, the spontaneous creative activity of the conatus, is structured under the influence of a set of axiological schemes and already constituted valorisations

[...] Coercion and consent are forms of the lived experience (respectively sad and joyful) of determination. To be coerced is to have been determined to do something but in a state of sadness. And to consent – to consent to follow, in the sense of the sequor of the obsequium – is to live one’s obed…

But this ‘of our own accord’ merely an actantial indication; it has nothing to say about everything that preceded it.