I was in China, mostly Beijing, a couple of weeks ago, checking on a property investment. The property sector is important: A lot of the pressure on raw materials prices supposedly coming out of China was related to the property sector, to construction. The amount of building that had been going on was enormous and visible, all over Beijing. I saw one luxury housing development after another, most of them just in the process of construction, or recently completed, and…sales had last year just come to a halt. It was amazing, the physical reconstruction of that city. A lot of it had to do with the Olympics, but a lot of it also had to do with property speculation.

And Beijing really is not the city that had the most residential property speculation. The optimism that pumped up that sector was pretty incredible. Here you have a provincial city where there was maybe one 4-star hotel—suddenly there are four 5-star hotel projects under construction, and you just wonder who the heck is going to stay in them. A city that really didn’t have much in the way of luxury housing suddenly has tons of luxury projects sprouting up, a lot of those getting sold to speculators, with nobody at the end of the chain. Toward the end of last year people realized just how far supply had outrun real demand, and how far prices had run up.

[...] some of the banks have come out and said that their business in January and February and March was profitable—Citi was the first to do it, Bank of America said so, Goldman actually reported this week. Personally, I think it’s a load of bollocks. I mean, as a bank, you have a lot of freedom to mark your assets where you please, particularly the loan book. You can show a profit, you can show whatever profit you want. You have a lot of scope to manage your P&L [profit-and-loss statement]. In the emerging markets I’ve often seen banks showing quarterly profits until the day they go belly-up.

preferring to restrict itself to a more wonted regulatory role

[...] the way they think doesn’t admit of a world where Citibank gets nationalized. It’s just so inconceivable to them that they say, “You just can’t do that! It’ll cause all of these horrible problems.” Well, that was true when the economy was in an extremely unstable state and risk aversion was extreme and panic was abroad in the land. But now I don’t think that’s the case, and your lack of imagination is not a good grounds for a policy judgment.

[...] Anybody who worked in sectors where there was a tremendous amount of activity where there shouldn’t have been. So we’re talking about housing. It means the Mexican guy who hammered together the house. It means the logger who cut down the wood that was used in the structural lumber. The guy who worked at the sawmill. It means the steel company that created the steel for the nails. It means the mortgage broker who sold the mortgage. It means the physicists who decided instead of doing physics they should work on Wall Street to create the asset-backed security that helped to fund the mortgages that the mortgage broker was originating. All of these people were doing things that turned out not to be productive.

The mortgage brokers probably spent all of their money. The mortgage-backed securities structurers maybe didn’t spend all of their money. But when you have an economy where contracts can be rewritten and you can go back and try to claw back money from people years after the fact, that’s going to be tremendously destabilizing and it’s going to really disincentivize investment in human capital. And it’s going to incentivize people to work in the gray economy. I think the answer is, for some of these jobs, jobs like in the investment business, going forth contractually, we should create compensation arrangements where there are clawbacks. But you have to do that by agreement and in advance. You can’t reopen contractual arrangements years after the fact. At least not without some strong indications of knowing fraud.