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This is a personal project by @dellsystem. I built this to help me retain information from the books I'm reading.

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Showing results by Douglas Rushkoff only

[...] Mozilla is actually made up of two different entities: the Mozilla Foundation, a nonprofit, and the Mozilla Corporation, which the foundation oversees. The subsidiary corporation is responsible for much of Mozilla software’s development, marketing, and distribution. It collects the massive revenue generated by Firefox, but it has no publicly traded stock, no dividends, and no shareholders [...]

ehh.. this isnt a good thing. where do Firefox's revenues come from??? partnering with Google. ie advertising. think about that pls

—p.122 Chapter Two (68) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

Currencies, tokens, and precious metals have indeed been used as means of exchange for thousands of years; but debt-based, interest-bearing, bank-issued central currency is a very particular tool with very particular biases—most significantly, a bias for growth. Capitalism itself is less the driver of this currency than it is the result. Capital is not an ideology so much as an artifact of a kind of money—a way of exploiting a particular operating system that runs on growth.

should think about this more to see how it connects (or otherwise) with more critical perspectives on capitalism

—p.126 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

[...] Money makes money faster than people or companies can create value. The richest people and companies should, therefore, position themselves as far away from working or creating things, and as close to the money spigot, as possible.

good metaphor. on financial services dominating the economy

(a few pages later, he talks about Jack Welch instructing biz school students to "see productive industries as mere stepping-stones to becoming holding companies. The further up the money chain you can get—the more like a bank issuing money—the better")

—p.131 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

This is the real cause of the severity and longevity of the 2007 crash. Rather than figuring out how to compensate for central currency’s extractive bias, a highly digital finance industry chose to exploit it. The digital perspective that allows us to see money as an operating system doesn’t necessarily motivate people to revise the core code so that it serves people better. That would be a pretty heavy lift, even for the most idealistic among us. So instead, bankers and financiers sought to leverage the structural flaws of the money system for their own gain.

this metaphor is getting a little old by this point, but still worth remembering

instead of refactoring codebase ... think about who the players are in this analogy. in a communal software system, who has the ability to refactor? who has the ability (and incentive) to exploit flaws? it's almost a tragedy of the commons-type scenario

—p.133 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

[...] speculators saw in digital technology a gateway to a new, virtual form of colonialism: a new place to lend and deploy capital, new territory for growth.

Alas, the big data profiles of teenagers can’t support the same robustness of growth as entire continents of slaves and spices. Besides, consumer research is all about winning some portion of a fixed number of purchases. It doesn’t create more consumption. If anything, technological solutions tend to make markets smaller and less likely to spawn associated industries in shipping, resource management, and labor services. They make the differential between real growth and return on capital worse, not better. This means they push the banks and investors even further away from anything like real earnings until eventually there’s a complete disconnect between capital and value.

big fan of the colonialism metaphor tbh. shoot that shit straight into my veins

I don't agree that it doesn't create more consumption though. Maybe not more overall (perhaps??) but definitely more in certain sectors (useless commodities, experiences, etc)

—p.136 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

[...] Credit-card companies are earning 3 or 4 percent on every purchase. That’s more than the growth rate of the entire economy. And it doesn’t even account for the primary source of credit-card company revenue, which is all the interest customers are paying (or further accumulating) on their balances. When a whole marketplace is not only paying up to the bank in the form of debt-based money but also paying a trusted authority to verify transactions, marginal costs become unsustainable. Merchants must mark up their prices to account for all the transaction fees, and commerce slows. Only giant retailers, with the ability to borrow money less expensively or even offer their own credit cards, are capable of reducing these fixed costs by filling some of the roles of the trusted central authority themselves.

connect this to merchants marking up prices to account for costs of advertising. equivalent

—p.142 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

It’s yet another example of the industrial-age ethos that places human needs and values below those of the greater machines and systems in which we live. By contrast, the digital media environment invites us to look at the systems we use as changeable programs, and people as the end users for whom those systems are built. Computer programs like Bitcoin may be the most explicitly digital expression of this drive to hack economics as if it were an operating system. But the Bitcoin protocols are still more concerned with replicating the functions of money than they are with serving the needs of humans. [...]

that marx quote about systems we create instead dominating ourselves

—p.152 Chapter Three (124) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

[...] Neither the financial advisor nor the plan administrator is liable for results. Under the new scheme, a much larger portion of the same pot of retirement money could be extracted in fees to support the careers of many more financial advisors and services, since now everyone gets a customized, personal account.

Financial firms also won a vast pool of new clients with very little financial acumen and no real bargaining power—a far cry from the professional, corporate pension managers of the past. The industry made every effort to market retirement plans as tools of empowerment for individuals. As their own marketing research shows, however, they were actually pitting the unique weaknesses of individual investors against themselves, leveraging the investors’ ignorance of the marketplace and its rules, as well as known gaps—what gamers would call “exploits”—in people’s financial psychology [...]

on how the rise of the 401(k) as an individual plan represented the apotheosis of neoliberalism's effects on the psyche/attitudes

—p.172 Chapter Four (168) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

At one well-meaning Southern California fitness app startup I visited regularly, the young founders held weekly meetings at which the chief technology officer would educate his engineers on different aspects of the development process. But as time went on, he grew less likely to lecture on programming biofeedback interfaces than on business strategy. It was as if he had cracked a new sort of code. He spoke of scalable solutions, long-term contracts, and high switching costs—steps they could take to ensure “defensible outcomes” and achieve a “platform monopoly.

He had fully accepted the startup playbook’s emphasis on massive growth above all else and was now turning his tremendous capacity for programming toward that singular, highly limited ambition. The product was less important now than the prize. He and his partner were not in a position to entertain a true disruption of the marketplace, anyway. They had won one of those pitch-your-idea contests by coming up with an idea literally overnight. The venture capital flowed in days later, and these kids were—like so many other young entrepreneurs who accept tens of millions of dollars up front—obligated to build a company worth a billion dollars.

lolll this is like exactly what I'm saying in Silicon Inquiry

—p.187 Chapter Four (168) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

[...] As long as there is a chance, however small, for a company to become a billion-dollar supersuccess, the investor would rather push on. This means abandoning even surefire profit models if they aren’t going to generate the outlandish returns required by the venture capitalist’s overall portfolio strategy. He or she would prefer to let the company die, squeezing out every possible megawin, than let it carry on as a moderately successful enterprise. Without a major exit through acquisition or IPO, it is worthless on the level that venture capitalists are playing the game.

I’ve sat in on more than one board meeting, watching as investors teach their young company founders about the realities of the startup landscape and why they have to shoot for the stars. Every company must become the universal solution in its vertical—or more. You are not just a personal health app; you are the platform through which all health apps will be executed! You are not just a game; you are a gamification operating system and social network!

reading this makes me wanna cry cus that's exactly how we thought at macro. i remember that diagram on the whiteboard where we positioned ourselves as this universal layer underlying all these social networks. and we didnt even take VC. but we internalised all that bs logic anyway. sobbing rn

—p.189 Chapter Four (168) by Douglas Rushkoff 6 years, 3 months ago

Showing results by Douglas Rushkoff only