Welcome to Bookmarker!

This is a personal project by @dellsystem. I built this to help me retain information from the books I'm reading.

Source code on GitHub (MIT license).

66

[...] Consider 'green jobs', for example. Within that category there are occupations that are both high-productivity and scalable, such as work on production lines making wind turbines or solar panels. But, unfortunately, such work is easily automatable. [...]

you can tell he's gotten so used to thinking of providing jobs as a telos that he fails to consider 1) the environmental implications of this (earlier, he obliviously compares this to the fracking industry) or 2) the possibility that automatable work is GOOD (which he does acknowledge in other parts but I guess his latent ideology slips out sometimes)

—p.66 In Search of a Better Sponge (64) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] Consider 'green jobs', for example. Within that category there are occupations that are both high-productivity and scalable, such as work on production lines making wind turbines or solar panels. But, unfortunately, such work is easily automatable. [...]

you can tell he's gotten so used to thinking of providing jobs as a telos that he fails to consider 1) the environmental implications of this (earlier, he obliviously compares this to the fracking industry) or 2) the possibility that automatable work is GOOD (which he does acknowledge in other parts but I guess his latent ideology slips out sometimes)

—p.66 In Search of a Better Sponge (64) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
77

In a very low-wage world, more people will opt out of work. That will inevitably strain the social-safety net; societies will be ever more clearly divided into those who work and pay for social programmes and those who live off them. Societies will face a reckoning: either they will decide that this dynamic is unavoidable and should be made to work as effectively as possible, or the haves will reduce aid to the have-nots, leading to intense political conflict between those two groups.

That conflict will be shaped and determined by which groups most effectively wield power.

this is the closest he gets to being radical

—p.77 In Search of a Better Sponge (64) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

In a very low-wage world, more people will opt out of work. That will inevitably strain the social-safety net; societies will be ever more clearly divided into those who work and pay for social programmes and those who live off them. Societies will face a reckoning: either they will decide that this dynamic is unavoidable and should be made to work as effectively as possible, or the haves will reduce aid to the have-nots, leading to intense political conflict between those two groups.

That conflict will be shaped and determined by which groups most effectively wield power.

this is the closest he gets to being radical

—p.77 In Search of a Better Sponge (64) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
102

The digital revolution makes it far easier and cheaper to keep an eye on certain sorts of workers and assess their performance. As a result, the boundaries of the typical firm have shifted. [...]

ah yes, the surveillance capitalism aspect which he seems to think of as a good thing

—p.102 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

The digital revolution makes it far easier and cheaper to keep an eye on certain sorts of workers and assess their performance. As a result, the boundaries of the typical firm have shifted. [...]

ah yes, the surveillance capitalism aspect which he seems to think of as a good thing

—p.102 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
115

[...] As the information-processing capacity of firms has grown in importance--as culture has come to matter more--those working in successful firms have come to enjoy a critical advantage over those working elsewhere.

I find it baffling that he attributes it to "culture". I mean, it's not necessarily wrong (depending on how vaguely you define "culture") but it does feel very misleading. Is IP law "culture"? Is having access to cheap and pliable labour to do the shit work your high-skilled employees don't want to do "culture"?

—p.115 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] As the information-processing capacity of firms has grown in importance--as culture has come to matter more--those working in successful firms have come to enjoy a critical advantage over those working elsewhere.

I find it baffling that he attributes it to "culture". I mean, it's not necessarily wrong (depending on how vaguely you define "culture") but it does feel very misleading. Is IP law "culture"? Is having access to cheap and pliable labour to do the shit work your high-skilled employees don't want to do "culture"?

—p.115 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
116

[...] A firm's cultural capital lives in all its employees; if one quits, it is not threatened; if most do, it is. When labour is organised, it can appropriate the returns of this cultural capital (as it deserves to do). When it isn't, the returns are most easily appropriated by top executives.

ok he does recognise this too

—p.116 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] A firm's cultural capital lives in all its employees; if one quits, it is not threatened; if most do, it is. When labour is organised, it can appropriate the returns of this cultural capital (as it deserves to do). When it isn't, the returns are most easily appropriated by top executives.

ok he does recognise this too

—p.116 The Firm as an Information-Processing Organism (97) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
121

Social capital is not quite as intuitive a concept as plain old capital. Physical capital--buildings and computers et al--shapes the way people behave at work. Social capital--behavioural patterns that live in our heads--do too.

on p122 he defines it as "individual knowledge that only has value in particular social contexts" which makes it an interesting concept, but it is quite different from more recognisable definitions (e.g., Bourdieu's)

—p.121 Social Capital in the Twenty-First Century (118) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

Social capital is not quite as intuitive a concept as plain old capital. Physical capital--buildings and computers et al--shapes the way people behave at work. Social capital--behavioural patterns that live in our heads--do too.

on p122 he defines it as "individual knowledge that only has value in particular social contexts" which makes it an interesting concept, but it is quite different from more recognisable definitions (e.g., Bourdieu's)

—p.121 Social Capital in the Twenty-First Century (118) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
140

Hopefully, thinking about society in this way allows us to better understand differences in economic performance. Social capital evolves over long periods of time, lives in the heads of those operating within society (but is often embodied in institutions, such as governments or firms), and influences economic behaviour. Some forms of social capital are growth compatible, others are not. In rich countries, norms and institutions encourage the clever application of new ideas to profitable ends, and innovators can take comfort in the belief that their efforts will be fairly judged in the market, and that any returns they earn will not be unjustly seized by others or the state.

[...] social capital can't easily be exported. [...] Social-capital-rich countries can merely try to create conditions that encourage the accumulation of healthy social capital in poorer countries. The European Union is a grand effort to do something very much along those lines: to create the incentives in peripheral European states with weaker social capital to invest in and deepen the sorts of social capital that are conducive to openness, the rule of law and free markets. International trade agreements and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are another way in which states actively seek to nurture social-capital deepening in poorer countries. Countries constantly use the geopolitical leverage available to them to try to improve the behaviour of troublesome neighbours, and these efforts occasionally bear fruit. Yet we should also acknowledge that countries are not, on the whole, very good at encouraging social-capital accumulation in others.

this is the most naive BS i've ever seen. defining social capital in this fairly standard and positive way and assuming THAT accounts for differences in economic performance is just ... unbelievable

the use of "fairly judged" is just wow, there's a lot to unpack here

plus this view of institutions like the EU and the WTO as benign (or even good) is so childlike

he then goes on to suggest migration as a solution which is obviously problematic (wtf happens to everybody else???)

—p.140 Social Capital in the Twenty-First Century (118) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

Hopefully, thinking about society in this way allows us to better understand differences in economic performance. Social capital evolves over long periods of time, lives in the heads of those operating within society (but is often embodied in institutions, such as governments or firms), and influences economic behaviour. Some forms of social capital are growth compatible, others are not. In rich countries, norms and institutions encourage the clever application of new ideas to profitable ends, and innovators can take comfort in the belief that their efforts will be fairly judged in the market, and that any returns they earn will not be unjustly seized by others or the state.

[...] social capital can't easily be exported. [...] Social-capital-rich countries can merely try to create conditions that encourage the accumulation of healthy social capital in poorer countries. The European Union is a grand effort to do something very much along those lines: to create the incentives in peripheral European states with weaker social capital to invest in and deepen the sorts of social capital that are conducive to openness, the rule of law and free markets. International trade agreements and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are another way in which states actively seek to nurture social-capital deepening in poorer countries. Countries constantly use the geopolitical leverage available to them to try to improve the behaviour of troublesome neighbours, and these efforts occasionally bear fruit. Yet we should also acknowledge that countries are not, on the whole, very good at encouraging social-capital accumulation in others.

this is the most naive BS i've ever seen. defining social capital in this fairly standard and positive way and assuming THAT accounts for differences in economic performance is just ... unbelievable

the use of "fairly judged" is just wow, there's a lot to unpack here

plus this view of institutions like the EU and the WTO as benign (or even good) is so childlike

he then goes on to suggest migration as a solution which is obviously problematic (wtf happens to everybody else???)

—p.140 Social Capital in the Twenty-First Century (118) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
153

[...] Big, skilled places are good at making workers more productive. Workers in places like Silicon Valley earn a hefty wage premium over similar workers in other cities, but new arrivals don't get the premium all at once. Instead it builds over time: evidence that the city is contributing to the knowledge and employability of the workers within it.

I mean it's true if you have a very value-neutral definition of the word "productive"? you could also just view it as rent ... or sucking more labour hours out of each worker

—p.153 Playgrounds of the 1 per cent (147) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] Big, skilled places are good at making workers more productive. Workers in places like Silicon Valley earn a hefty wage premium over similar workers in other cities, but new arrivals don't get the premium all at once. Instead it builds over time: evidence that the city is contributing to the knowledge and employability of the workers within it.

I mean it's true if you have a very value-neutral definition of the word "productive"? you could also just view it as rent ... or sucking more labour hours out of each worker

—p.153 Playgrounds of the 1 per cent (147) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
165

[...] social capital is the indispensable factor. Successful countries have good institutions, such as strong and stable governments committed to protecting personal property rights. Social capital supports the evolution and development of growth-boosting institutions, which in turns support the continued accumulation of social capital.

[...] healthy democracies and market economies cannot be imposed on sociteies that lack the underlying supportive social capital; they are emergent phenomena in countries with the right sort of social capital.

And so, historically, rich countries tend to stay rich while poor countries tend to stay poor. [...]

[...] development of the right sort of social capital is hard. Sadly, social scientists lack a satisfying explanation for how it occurs.

he poses the question on p165 but notwhere on any of these pages does he mention colonialism or its modern-day equivalent ...? or differing access to natural resources? i can't even

also is it an accident that he parroted the Tory motto here lmao

—p.165 Hyperglobalization and the Never-Developing World (162) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] social capital is the indispensable factor. Successful countries have good institutions, such as strong and stable governments committed to protecting personal property rights. Social capital supports the evolution and development of growth-boosting institutions, which in turns support the continued accumulation of social capital.

[...] healthy democracies and market economies cannot be imposed on sociteies that lack the underlying supportive social capital; they are emergent phenomena in countries with the right sort of social capital.

And so, historically, rich countries tend to stay rich while poor countries tend to stay poor. [...]

[...] development of the right sort of social capital is hard. Sadly, social scientists lack a satisfying explanation for how it occurs.

he poses the question on p165 but notwhere on any of these pages does he mention colonialism or its modern-day equivalent ...? or differing access to natural resources? i can't even

also is it an accident that he parroted the Tory motto here lmao

—p.165 Hyperglobalization and the Never-Developing World (162) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago
174

[...] we once devoted most of our household budgets to physical things: food and drink, clothing and furniture. Now we spend vast amounts on things like education and healthcare, or on housing [...]

funny he mentions those three because they have all been provided (to varying degrees) by the govt in various parts of the world at different points in time ... he's talking about a household budget, not govt, so maybe he means American consumer here? but then that's an isolated case where tons of money is being siphoned off in the system by (say) overpaid administrators / HMOs and pharmaceutical companies / predatory landlords and letting agencies. ofc he doesn't address that aspect

—p.174 Hyperglobalization and the Never-Developing World (162) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago

[...] we once devoted most of our household budgets to physical things: food and drink, clothing and furniture. Now we spend vast amounts on things like education and healthcare, or on housing [...]

funny he mentions those three because they have all been provided (to varying degrees) by the govt in various parts of the world at different points in time ... he's talking about a household budget, not govt, so maybe he means American consumer here? but then that's an isolated case where tons of money is being siphoned off in the system by (say) overpaid administrators / HMOs and pharmaceutical companies / predatory landlords and letting agencies. ofc he doesn't address that aspect

—p.174 Hyperglobalization and the Never-Developing World (162) by Ryan Avent 7 years ago