by
Jacobin
6
[...] Most public libraries are funded by property taxes, which create well-funded libraries in wealthy areas and underfunded ones in communities where a library would benefit people most. Educational institutions would not have to grovel to corporate interests if they were divorced from property-tax-based funding. We need equitably distributed funds for all public education.
letter from Mike Monahan, Chicago, IL
[...] Most public libraries are funded by property taxes, which create well-funded libraries in wealthy areas and underfunded ones in communities where a library would benefit people most. Educational institutions would not have to grovel to corporate interests if they were divorced from property-tax-based funding. We need equitably distributed funds for all public education.
letter from Mike Monahan, Chicago, IL
9
[...] We can’t count on the Democrats to put up a fight; the fight must come from the Left.
[...] the Left needs a vision, not a defensive posture. We must organize around a positive, forward-looking program for real change — a program that gives people
something to fight for, not just something to fight against.
[...] We can’t count on the Democrats to put up a fight; the fight must come from the Left.
[...] the Left needs a vision, not a defensive posture. We must organize around a positive, forward-looking program for real change — a program that gives people
something to fight for, not just something to fight against.
14
The Left no longer has Marxism or any other coherent intellectual structure ... no rigorous foundation to rely on, no ideology to give it organization and shape.... It undermines the power and effectiveness of modern politics more generally.
David Brooks with a surprisingly valid critique of modern-day liberals
The Left no longer has Marxism or any other coherent intellectual structure ... no rigorous foundation to rely on, no ideology to give it organization and shape.... It undermines the power and effectiveness of modern politics more generally.
David Brooks with a surprisingly valid critique of modern-day liberals
16
The big question is whether this nationalist political right represents a turn away from transnational capital accumulation. These forces sometimes express themselves as protectors of domestic manufacturing jobs. But I don’t think that’s their main thrust. Their main thrust is to define the nation again in xenophobic terms, which also combines with protection of old cultural values that would restore hierarchies of race, gender, and sexual orientation.
in response to the interviewer's comment that Trump's economic agenda is just "neoliberalism with a white nationalist face"
The big question is whether this nationalist political right represents a turn away from transnational capital accumulation. These forces sometimes express themselves as protectors of domestic manufacturing jobs. But I don’t think that’s their main thrust. Their main thrust is to define the nation again in xenophobic terms, which also combines with protection of old cultural values that would restore hierarchies of race, gender, and sexual orientation.
in response to the interviewer's comment that Trump's economic agenda is just "neoliberalism with a white nationalist face"
17
[...] it’s worth remembering that fascist regimes were capitalist. There is a tendency among analysts to think of capitalist regimes as tending to be free-market, but the type of state-led capitalism that Hitler introduced was very much capitalist. [...] we might see authoritarian state-led, but blatantly capitalist, infrastructure programs and policies.
[...] it’s worth remembering that fascist regimes were capitalist. There is a tendency among analysts to think of capitalist regimes as tending to be free-market, but the type of state-led capitalism that Hitler introduced was very much capitalist. [...] we might see authoritarian state-led, but blatantly capitalist, infrastructure programs and policies.
18
Yet both of them played the nationalist card, and it shows the extent to which the nation-state has remained integral to the global accumulation projects of so many capitalists. These guys understand that for accumulation to continue on a global scale, you need to legitimate it by attaching it to a xenophobic nationalism of some kind. They’re trying to ride this tiger of nationalistic ideology that allows global accumulation to continue. That may be at the expense of the Ukrainian or the
Estonian nationalists, and for sure at the expense of Mexican immigrants, let alone refugees of every sort.
on the similarities between Trump and Nigel Farage
Yet both of them played the nationalist card, and it shows the extent to which the nation-state has remained integral to the global accumulation projects of so many capitalists. These guys understand that for accumulation to continue on a global scale, you need to legitimate it by attaching it to a xenophobic nationalism of some kind. They’re trying to ride this tiger of nationalistic ideology that allows global accumulation to continue. That may be at the expense of the Ukrainian or the
Estonian nationalists, and for sure at the expense of Mexican immigrants, let alone refugees of every sort.
on the similarities between Trump and Nigel Farage
24
The American right [...] is on the march again. In some sense, this resurgence is hard to understand. If you buy the thesis that the Right is driven by a defense of hierarchy and privilege and draws its energy from opposition to a strong left, its strength is almost incomprehensible. It’s hard to think of a time when American capital and capitalists were so politically secure. [...]
what more do they want
The American right [...] is on the march again. In some sense, this resurgence is hard to understand. If you buy the thesis that the Right is driven by a defense of hierarchy and privilege and draws its energy from opposition to a strong left, its strength is almost incomprehensible. It’s hard to think of a time when American capital and capitalists were so politically secure. [...]
what more do they want
25
[...] for most of the twentieth century, while the GOP was usually more conservative, especially on economic issues, than the Democrats, there was a great deal of ideological diversity within the two major parties. The Republican Party also had a liberal wing, just as the Democrats had a conservative wing.
[...]
[...] the GOP of the 1950s and 1960s often had a stronger civil rights record than the Democrats, because the Dems still had a large Southern component.
Into the 1960s, the Republicans often were stronger on civil liberties than Democrats as well. [...]
alas
[...] for most of the twentieth century, while the GOP was usually more conservative, especially on economic issues, than the Democrats, there was a great deal of ideological diversity within the two major parties. The Republican Party also had a liberal wing, just as the Democrats had a conservative wing.
[...]
[...] the GOP of the 1950s and 1960s often had a stronger civil rights record than the Democrats, because the Dems still had a large Southern component.
Into the 1960s, the Republicans often were stronger on civil liberties than Democrats as well. [...]
alas
28
Movement conservatives were undeterred by Goldwater’s massive loss and continued with their plot to take over the Republican Party. A year later, Buckley ran for mayor of New York on the Conservative Party ticket, with the conscious aim of drawing enough votes away from the liberal Republican John Lindsay to elect the Democratic candidate, Abe Beame, and thereby weaken the GOP’s left flank. (The contrast with liberals, who shy away from any third-party challenge that might lead their party to a loss, is a vivid symptom of their lack of conviction.) [...]
Movement conservatives were undeterred by Goldwater’s massive loss and continued with their plot to take over the Republican Party. A year later, Buckley ran for mayor of New York on the Conservative Party ticket, with the conscious aim of drawing enough votes away from the liberal Republican John Lindsay to elect the Democratic candidate, Abe Beame, and thereby weaken the GOP’s left flank. (The contrast with liberals, who shy away from any third-party challenge that might lead their party to a loss, is a vivid symptom of their lack of conviction.) [...]
29
[...] many of the businesspeople who pushed the neoliberal agenda in the 1970s were neither movement conservatives nor self-made entrepreneurs but career managers. They were often socially liberal. But they objected to the host of new claims along what we’d later call identitarian lines (gender, race, etc.) as well as an explosive growth in social regulations (environment, workplace safety, and the like, as opposed to more narrowly drawn economic regulation of prices and product lines), which they felt were annoying restrictions on the free play of capital. [...]
their solution: forming PACs (legalised by the FEC in 1975) that argued, among other things, that corporations had no social responsibility (in the same vein as Milton Friedman)
[...] many of the businesspeople who pushed the neoliberal agenda in the 1970s were neither movement conservatives nor self-made entrepreneurs but career managers. They were often socially liberal. But they objected to the host of new claims along what we’d later call identitarian lines (gender, race, etc.) as well as an explosive growth in social regulations (environment, workplace safety, and the like, as opposed to more narrowly drawn economic regulation of prices and product lines), which they felt were annoying restrictions on the free play of capital. [...]
their solution: forming PACs (legalised by the FEC in 1975) that argued, among other things, that corporations had no social responsibility (in the same vein as Milton Friedman)