DIVINE VIOLENCE
the philosophical attempt to describe things in terms of their apparent intrinsic purpose, directive principle, or goal, irrespective of human use or opinion
Is there a whole which can teleologically justify and thus redeem or sublate an event such as the Holocaust?
Is there a whole which can teleologically justify and thus redeem or sublate an event such as the Holocaust?
(adjective) producing, relating to, or marked by intentional distortion (as by unequal magnification along perpendicular axes) of an image
The plane which hit the World Trade Center tower could literally be understood as the ultimate Hitchcockian blot, the anamorphic stain which denaturalised the idyllic New York landscape
The plane which hit the World Trade Center tower could literally be understood as the ultimate Hitchcockian blot, the anamorphic stain which denaturalised the idyllic New York landscape
[...] We humans are left with no higher power watching over us, only the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the fate of divine creation, and thus for God himself.
referring to a G.K. Chesteron quote, in which Father Brown concludes "He was made Man."
relates to my thoughts on market justice (note 1090)
[...] We humans are left with no higher power watching over us, only the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the fate of divine creation, and thus for God himself.
referring to a G.K. Chesteron quote, in which Father Brown concludes "He was made Man."
relates to my thoughts on market justice (note 1090)
(from the Latin talio) a retaliation authorized by law, in which the punishment corresponds in kind and degree to the injury (eye for an eye)
When a subject is hurt in such a devastating way that the very idea of revenge according to ius talionis is no less ridiculous than the promise of the reconciliation with the perpetrator after the perpetrator’s atonement
When a subject is hurt in such a devastating way that the very idea of revenge according to ius talionis is no less ridiculous than the promise of the reconciliation with the perpetrator after the perpetrator’s atonement
The first thing to do here is to assert the priority of the Jewish principle of just revenge/punishment – an ‘eye for an eye’, the ius talionis – over the standard formula of ‘we will forgive your crime, but we will not forget it’.
The first thing to do here is to assert the priority of the Jewish principle of just revenge/punishment – an ‘eye for an eye’, the ius talionis – over the standard formula of ‘we will forgive your crime, but we will not forget it’.
ethical component of the personality and provides the moral standards by which the ego operates (acc to Sigmund Freud)
we are forever indebted to Christ, we cannot ever repay him for what he did for us. The Freudian name for such excessive pressure which we cannot ever remunerate is, of course, superego
we are forever indebted to Christ, we cannot ever repay him for what he did for us. The Freudian name for such excessive pressure which we cannot ever remunerate is, of course, superego
a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments
a pseudo-dialectical synthesis of the two terms as a way of resolving the eternal dilemma ‘to punish or to forgive’: first, punish the perpetrator, then forgive him
a pseudo-dialectical synthesis of the two terms as a way of resolving the eternal dilemma ‘to punish or to forgive’: first, punish the perpetrator, then forgive him
The big argument of anti-(death-)penalty advocates is the arrogance of punishing other human beings, or even killing them. What gives us the right to do this? Are we really in a position to judge? The best answer to this is to turn the argument round. What is really arrogant and sinful is to assume the prerogative of mercy. Who among us, ordinary mortals, especially if we are not the culprit’s immediate victim, has the right to erase another’s crime, to treat it with leniency? Only God himself – or, in state terms, the very pinnacle of power, king or president – has, owing to his exceptional position, the prerogative of erasing another’s guilt. Our duty is to act according to the logic of justice and punish crime: not to do so entails the true blasphemy of elevating oneself to the level of God, of acting with his authority.
I don't really agree with this but it would be interesting to think about this in reference to Camus' essay on the death penalty, in a--dare I say it--dialectical way
The big argument of anti-(death-)penalty advocates is the arrogance of punishing other human beings, or even killing them. What gives us the right to do this? Are we really in a position to judge? The best answer to this is to turn the argument round. What is really arrogant and sinful is to assume the prerogative of mercy. Who among us, ordinary mortals, especially if we are not the culprit’s immediate victim, has the right to erase another’s crime, to treat it with leniency? Only God himself – or, in state terms, the very pinnacle of power, king or president – has, owing to his exceptional position, the prerogative of erasing another’s guilt. Our duty is to act according to the logic of justice and punish crime: not to do so entails the true blasphemy of elevating oneself to the level of God, of acting with his authority.
I don't really agree with this but it would be interesting to think about this in reference to Camus' essay on the death penalty, in a--dare I say it--dialectical way
(adjective) of, relating to, or characteristic of Hegel, his philosophy, or his dialectic method / (noun) a follower of Hegel; an adherent of Hegelianism
It is only when she decides on her revenge that she effectively acts as and becomes one of them, losing her arrogant, superior position. In killing them, she recognises them in a Hegelian way.
It is only when she decides on her revenge that she effectively acts as and becomes one of them, losing her arrogant, superior position. In killing them, she recognises them in a Hegelian way.
a lower-class Parisian republican in the French Revolution; an extreme republican or revolutionary
For Danton, the Jacobin, revolutionary state terror was a kind of pre-emptive action whose true aim was not revenge on the enemies but to prevent the direct ‘divine’ violence of the sans-culottes, of the people themselves. In other words, let us do what the people demand of us so that they will not do it themselves…
for a fairly low-brow cultural connection, refer to the episode of Pretty Little Liars when Mike punches Ezra despite lacking any real anger towards him because he doesn't want his father to do it
For Danton, the Jacobin, revolutionary state terror was a kind of pre-emptive action whose true aim was not revenge on the enemies but to prevent the direct ‘divine’ violence of the sans-culottes, of the people themselves. In other words, let us do what the people demand of us so that they will not do it themselves…
for a fairly low-brow cultural connection, refer to the episode of Pretty Little Liars when Mike punches Ezra despite lacking any real anger towards him because he doesn't want his father to do it
the ambivalence of love and hatred (a Lacanian concept)
Kierkegaard applies here the logic of hainamoration, later articulated by Lacan, which relies on the split in the beloved between the beloved person and the true object-cause of my love for him
Kierkegaard applies here the logic of hainamoration, later articulated by Lacan, which relies on the split in the beloved between the beloved person and the true object-cause of my love for him
referring to the Pauli exclusion principle (the assertion that no two fermions can have the same quantum number)
The notion of love should be given here all its Paulinian weight
The notion of love should be given here all its Paulinian weight