The theory of a common market with a common currency miraculously
creating convergence lies in tatters. On the contrary, bringing very different
economies and countries together in one currency zone took important
policy instruments away from weaker peripheral economies. Currency
devaluation and exchange-rate variation are but the most obvious exam-
ples. Convergence criteria sanctified price stability and utterly unfounded
public-deficit and debt-reduction targets. This straitjacket of Maastricht
mostly benefited Germany at the expense of weaker economies. The single
currency deepened the gap between Germany’s increasing surpluses and
trade and current account deficits in the periphery, two sides of a same
coin. Equal rules for different economies reinforced unequal development. One size fits none, Claus Offe summarized. Germany simultaneously
benefited from its leading position in both the machineries and chemicals
global markets. Berlin took full advantage of increasing demand in emerging
economies. Domestic labor market and security reforms in turn permitted
German multinational corporations to reduce the gap in profit margins with
their Japanese and American counterparts. These matter greatly not just
to finance future investments, but also to push up company share value.