The theory of a common market with a common currency miraculously
creating convergence lies in tatters. On the contrary, bringing very different
economies and countries together in one currency zone took important
policy instruments away from weaker peripheral economies. Currency
devaluation and exchange-rate variation are but the most obvious exam-
ples. Convergence criteria sanctified price stability and utterly unfounded
public-deficit and debt-reduction targets. This straitjacket of Maastricht
mostly benefited Germany at the expense of weaker economies. The single
currency deepened the gap between Germany’s increasing surpluses and
trade and current account deficits in the periphery, two sides of a same
coin. Equal rules for different economies reinforced unequal development. One size fits none, Claus Offe summarized. Germany simultaneously
benefited from its leading position in both the machineries and chemicals
global markets. Berlin took full advantage of increasing demand in emerging
economies. Domestic labor market and security reforms in turn permitted
German multinational corporations to reduce the gap in profit margins with
their Japanese and American counterparts. These matter greatly not just
to finance future investments, but also to push up company share value.

[...] In the absence of currency devaluation or exchangerate variations, wage compression for internal devaluation was meant to increase competitiveness. [...] Brussels, capital of the EU , is somewhat of a symbol. One in three city inhabitants is at risk of poverty. One child in four grows up in a family where no one has a job. Even temporarily forgetting about Greece, Brussels is no exception. Over the last decade, the number of working poor has doubled in Germany. In Italy, over 8 million people live in relative poverty. In France, 9 million people, of which 3 million are children, are poor. Portugal lost half a million workers between 2011 and 2014. While Portuguese workers were fleeing their country, big corporations saw their money reserves increase from 750 billion euros to 3,200 billion. The rich and wealthy meanwhile are seated on mountains of money, or rather, hiding them in tax havens across the world.

Six considerations seem to play a central role in the seductive force of a left-exit. (1) Left-wing policies are incompatible with the European treaties. (2) National states, preferably guided by left governments, can be allies or offer a bulwark against neoliberalism. (3) A demos exists only at the national level. Therefore, the national level is the most appropriate space to wage the struggle. (4) Power relations are more favorable in certain member states than in others. Nationally, we can show alternatives exist. (5) The EU is pitting people against each other, and an exit will allow for a different, real internationalism. A step back to leap forward. (6) A European continent-wide movement is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

[...] the ontology of the European state apparatus under construction leaves no doubt. Such a different Europe will require vastly different institutions. The current European treaties and institutions are designed not just to guarantee corporate oversight over decision-making at every level or create an interventionist “defense” system, but also to defuse, co-opt, and swallow any challenge to the system in an infinity of committees and commissions, meetings and institutions. European capital is building a state apparatus to obtain bigger slices of global spoils. Calls to save the EU or the social-democratic fantasy of turning this apparatus into a tool of and for labor are just that: fantasies obscuring the class nature of existing institutions. Rather than raising awareness of the need to build a counterforce to the power of capital, such claims reinforce illusions in the neutrality of the constructed apparatus.