In December 1932, Senator Hugo L. Black of Alabama had introduced a bill embodying the American Federation of Labor's thirty-hour-week formula for halting the depression. It proposed to close foreign and interstate commerce to products from establishments in which any person was allowed to work more than thirty hours a week. On April 5, 1933, with growing public support, the Senate passed the bill, 53 to 30.

But Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a month in office and pushing vigorously for economic recovery legislation, was uncomfortable with the bill. He shared industry's conviction that it was both unconstitutional and unworkable. In its stead, in early May, he sent Congress the National Industrial Recovery bill. It called for the establishment of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) under which business itself, freed from anti-trust restraints, would regulate "unfair competition and disastrous overproduction" through codes of fair competition. At the same time, the codes would shorten the work week and establish minimum wages. To balance the generous grant of economic power to industry, each code would be required to include a guarantee of the right of work.

Union fever swept across the land in a contagious epidemic. [...]

In the end Section 7(a) proved to be a false dawn. It was often
and widely resisted by employers; it failed at moments when it was
most urgently needed; it often turned out to be weak and helpless.
It was finally knocked down in May, 1935 by the United States
Supreme Court. But for the moment, it gave new hope and courage
to millions. Its recognition of the right to organize and bargain
collectively gave them an effective tool and freed them from apathy,
hopelessness, and inaction. It gave rise to a new militance, directed
not at revolutionary upheaval but at down-to-earth matters of
wages and hours, of status and dignity.