[...] Contract to the impression one gets from the media, just because the market is essential to capitalism, does not mean that capitalism is the market. [...] In truth, markets are only part of the capitalist system, a substantial and essential part to be sure, but there are others: state, family, nonmarket institutions like community groups and teams, and so forth. Nor are markets neutral realms in which supply and demand coolly intersect via the logic of competitive prices, as the harmonious classical and neoclassical models suggest. Markets are principal sites of conflict in capitalism, usually between actors who are not themselves organized according to market logic. If you think about it, even though the capitalist enterprise, the family (however defined), the state, and workers' organizations are among the key participants in capitalist markets, and some of them (especially firms and the state) are the loudest proponents of the benefits of market organization, not one is organized internally according to market principles. Internal relations in firms are not determined by atomistic competition any more than internal distribution of incomes in the civil service are determined by individual marginal contribution to productivity.

Orthodox economists do not walk the Earth naively believing all markets are actually perfect, if only the rest of us could see it. They know full well they are not. But orthodox capitalist analysts do not assume perfection because it accurately represents the world, but rather because without it, the formal modeling they do is impossible.

[...] The common claim that economics is evil because it "quantifies" everything is a weak and distracting argument; too many radical critics give it too much emphasis. It is hard to imagine that whatever world anticapitalism produces will not require lots of "quantitative" analysis. The very notion of redistribution--central to any anticapitalist politics--is unavoidably, if not completely, quantitative. [...]

Orthodox arguments about what markets can do only understand the "market" dimensions of markets, and can only understand those relative to a mythical standard. They cannot comprehend markets as dynamic social institutions, embedded, sometimes deeply, sometimes precariously, in real times and places. They cannot comprehend politics as anything other than external "disturbance" of the market, an obstacle to perfection.

Ultimately, orthodoxy does not have a very strong argument for the superiority of market organization, in the sense that it cannot base it on any sort of proof or logic. On the contrary, the commitment to the market is more a leap of faith; a leap, we are told, that if we all take it together, will performatively make it so. The fact that many of us are reluctant to take the leap has paradoxically become one of the go-to excuses for the failure of markets to work their magic. When capitalism does not deliver the goods, free marketeers almost inevitably attribute it to the fact that we are not committed enough to the market, that somehow we still intervene, preventing competition from realizing its potential.

[...] there are situations in which they don't seem to work all that well--and not merely relative to the perfection some assume they should attain, but even relative to suitably diminished "real-world" expectations. Economists call these "market failures," and perhaps the most commonly noted is the case of so-called "public goods." In political economy, public goods are not just things that are good for the public, but goods or services that it helps everyone to have, but for which there is insufficient incentive for capitalist investment. [...] even if an entrepreneur could come up with a way of "cleaning" the air, there is no way he or she could make a return on their investment because it would be impossible to prevent people from breathing cleaned air for free. Clean air, at least so far, is what economists call "nonexcludable" and "nonrival"--you may be able to provide it for a price, but it is impossible to prevent someone from using it at no cost (nonexcludability), and no matter how much one person uses, it does not diminish available supplies (non-rivalry). In the case of clean air, then, there is no market incentive to provide it: you can't exclude those who don't pay from using it, and no matter who or how many uses it, there is always enough left for others. In other words, you can't control its distribution via contract and you can't make it scarce enough to merit a price.

[...] in capitalism the realms of market and the firm are in fact necessary complements. There is choice regarding markets and hierarchies because both are essential to capitalist relations of production, distribution, and consumption. [...] the capitalist firm is a response to the information, coordination, and social conditions that limit what markets can do. In other words, one of the fundamental institutions of capitalism exists precisely because orthodox economics is wrong, and markets cannot do the work they are supposed to do.

[...] If wages were sufficiently flexible to clear all labour markets, then all firms would pay the same wage for the same work, and all workers could find work (the definition of market clearing). From a worker's perspective, quitting would be virtually costless. From an employer's perspective, commitment to the employee would be useless because they are all replaceable. This would build an unmanageable instability into capitalism, and--as unfortunately little-known economist Michael Kalecki has pointed out--is patently against capital's interests.

As Kalecki puts it, if the labour market ever worked the way neoclassical theory imagines it--if wages were flexible, Say's Law held, and all willing workers found jobs in some orthodox "full employment" dream--then workers would have no fear of "the sack." [...] Full employment would put the workers in charge [...]

In other words, despite any claims to the contrary, capitalism must have unemployment. It is essential to the system's political stability (by disciplining workers) and productivity (by keeping the prodction process in motion). This only further weakens the edifice of neoclassical "market-clearing" theory, because even if unemployment were not in capital's political economic interest, joblessness would persist. [...]

Kalecki's point is not only that full employment is impossible in capitalism, but that any substantial effort to provide full employment--perhaps through the state, or reduced work-weeks--would be aggressively opposed by employers. [...]

if the labour market ever worked the way neoclassical theory imagines it--if wages were flexible, Say's Law held, and all willing workers found jobs in some orthodox "full employment" dream--then workers would have no fear of "the sack."

[...] Polanyi has been rediscovered by critics of capitalism in recent years for two principal reasons. The first is his argument that capitalism only developed via the evolution of three "fictious commodities"--things that it must pretend are produced for sale on the market, but are not: land, labour, and money. Polanyi says that none of these are a commodity in the "widget" sense. Yet, because land, labour, and money must circulate on markets like other commodities to make capitalism work, we accept the fiction that they are commodities.

Polanyi's second contribution is his acount of modern capitalism's attempt to produce a social structure that "disembeds" the market from its broader historical and geographical context. This allows it to appear "self-regulating," divorced from the life-world in which all human activity is unavoidably embedded. [...] The upshot is that the contractual relations that define markets and firms in capitalism hinder by their very structure the creation of perfectly efficient, autonomous markets.