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67

Passage to India: The Giants in the Land of the Majors, 2000-2010

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Saraswati, J. (2012). Passage to India: The Giants in the Land of the Majors, 2000-2010. In Saraswati, J. Dot.compradors: Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry. Pluto Press, pp. 67-78

73

The competition in the domestic labour market between Giants and Majors initially induced the Indian Majors to move up the value chain. [...] the Majors had long since settled on informal anti-poaching agreements amongst themselves, acknowledging that the costs of poaching far outweighed the gains. Second, the Giants, who could in theory, reap all the benefits of poaching while facing none of the costs (given their superior ability to attract and retain talent), also refrained from such practices during this period. They were just beginning to enter India, had not yet secured NASSCOM, and did not want to trigger any antipathy to their expanding presence.

Without poaching, competition took place in graduate-level recruitment [...] the Majors were forced to raise their entry-level salaries. The commercial imperatives of ensuring they then got 'their money's worth' from such graduates impelled the firms to embark on significant organisational efforts to improve productivity. In particular, serious investments were made in staff training, quality control and other human-resource practices. [...]

These changes transformed the Indian software services firms, catapulting them up the value chain [...]

reminds me of the no-poaching agreements in SV, and also in Germany. what should the left take on this be???

—p.73 by Jyoti Saraswati 6 years ago

The competition in the domestic labour market between Giants and Majors initially induced the Indian Majors to move up the value chain. [...] the Majors had long since settled on informal anti-poaching agreements amongst themselves, acknowledging that the costs of poaching far outweighed the gains. Second, the Giants, who could in theory, reap all the benefits of poaching while facing none of the costs (given their superior ability to attract and retain talent), also refrained from such practices during this period. They were just beginning to enter India, had not yet secured NASSCOM, and did not want to trigger any antipathy to their expanding presence.

Without poaching, competition took place in graduate-level recruitment [...] the Majors were forced to raise their entry-level salaries. The commercial imperatives of ensuring they then got 'their money's worth' from such graduates impelled the firms to embark on significant organisational efforts to improve productivity. In particular, serious investments were made in staff training, quality control and other human-resource practices. [...]

These changes transformed the Indian software services firms, catapulting them up the value chain [...]

reminds me of the no-poaching agreements in SV, and also in Germany. what should the left take on this be???

—p.73 by Jyoti Saraswati 6 years ago
73

[...] Having secured their control of NASSCOM, and through NASSCOM the IT policy agenda, the Giants felt suitably emboldened to change tack in their recruitment. They stopped employing entry-level professionals and started poaching experienced employees of other software firms, in particular from Indian Majors. An unofficial feeder system quickly materialised whereby the Majors and other Indian software firms trained their employees only for the best and brightest to be poached by the Giants after a number of years.

The impact of this on the Majors was catastrophic. In their quest to compete with the Giants in the top tier of the software services industry, the retention of staff was vital. [...]

The effects played out in the wider competition between the Majors and the Giants. The Majors, wracked as they were with already high and growing attrition rates, struggled to move into the highest echelons of the software services market. In contrast, the Giants successfully entered the product market in lower-end IT services previously monopolised by the Indian Majors [...]

continuing from the previous note - that peaceful system didn't last

to think about more: what is the left objection to practices like this? why is a victory for global capital worse than a victory for domestic capital? should it be axiomatic or based on the specifics (income inequality between workers and execs, etc)

—p.73 by Jyoti Saraswati 6 years ago

[...] Having secured their control of NASSCOM, and through NASSCOM the IT policy agenda, the Giants felt suitably emboldened to change tack in their recruitment. They stopped employing entry-level professionals and started poaching experienced employees of other software firms, in particular from Indian Majors. An unofficial feeder system quickly materialised whereby the Majors and other Indian software firms trained their employees only for the best and brightest to be poached by the Giants after a number of years.

The impact of this on the Majors was catastrophic. In their quest to compete with the Giants in the top tier of the software services industry, the retention of staff was vital. [...]

The effects played out in the wider competition between the Majors and the Giants. The Majors, wracked as they were with already high and growing attrition rates, struggled to move into the highest echelons of the software services market. In contrast, the Giants successfully entered the product market in lower-end IT services previously monopolised by the Indian Majors [...]

continuing from the previous note - that peaceful system didn't last

to think about more: what is the left objection to practices like this? why is a victory for global capital worse than a victory for domestic capital? should it be axiomatic or based on the specifics (income inequality between workers and execs, etc)

—p.73 by Jyoti Saraswati 6 years ago