The Politics of Permanent Austerity
[...] the dumping of other (non-Greek) assets to cover their (Greek) losses, which then lowers the value of the unrelated assets, eventually leading to a fire sale of good assets as a whole [...]
thus other periphery countries were affected too (the rest of PIIGS)
[...] the dumping of other (non-Greek) assets to cover their (Greek) losses, which then lowers the value of the unrelated assets, eventually leading to a fire sale of good assets as a whole [...]
thus other periphery countries were affected too (the rest of PIIGS)
treay for creating the EU; signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European Community in Maastricht, Netherlands
Paul Krugman saw trouble in the decade of recession and unemployment necessitated by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the precondition for adoption of the euro
Paul Krugman saw trouble in the decade of recession and unemployment necessitated by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the precondition for adoption of the euro
[...] This is ordoliberalism gone mad, as well as the logic behind the euro [...] those rules only ever apply to sovereigns. [...] there was never much attention paid to the possibility that private actors, such as banks, would behave badly. Yet this is exactly what happened, and the EU is still blaming sovereigns, tying them down with new rules [..]
[...] This is ordoliberalism gone mad, as well as the logic behind the euro [...] those rules only ever apply to sovereigns. [...] there was never much attention paid to the possibility that private actors, such as banks, would behave badly. Yet this is exactly what happened, and the EU is still blaming sovereigns, tying them down with new rules [..]