[...] Such is the present paradox of ethics; if I am absorbed in treating a few chosen persons as absolute ends, for example, my wife, my son, my friends, the needy person I happen to come across, if I am bent upon fulfilling all my duties towards them, I shall spend my life doing so; I shall be led to pass over in silence the injustices of the age, the class struggle, colonialism, Anti-Semitism, etc., and, finally, to take advantage of oppression in order to do good. [...] if I throw myself into the revolutionary enterprise I risk having no more leisure for personal relations--worse still, of being led by the logic of the action into treating most men, and even my friends, as means. But if we start with the moral exigence which the aesthetic feeling envelops without meaning to do so, we are starting on the right foot. We must historicize the reader's goodwill, that is, by the formal agency of our work, we must, if possible provoke his intention of treating men, in every case, as an absolute end and, by the subject of our writing, direct his intention upon his neighbours, that is, upon the oppressed of the world. But we shall have accomplished if, in addition, we do not show him--and in the very warp and weft of the work--that it is quite impossible to treat concrete men as ends in contemporary society. Thus, he will be led by the hand until he is made to see that, in effect, what he wants is to eliminate the exploitation of man by man and that the city of ends which, with one stroke, he has set up in the aesthetic intuition is an ideal which we shall approach only at the end of a long historical evolution. In other words, we must transform his formal goodwill into a concrete and material will to change this world by specific means in order to help the coming of the concrete society of ends.
First of all, we can say that today's writing has freed itself from the theme of expression. Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority. This means that it is an interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified content than according to the very nature of the signifier. Writing unfolds like a game that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits. In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.
The first is the idea of the work [oeuvre]. It is a very familiar thesis that the task of criticism is not to bring out the work's relationships with the author, nor to reconstruct through the text a thought or experience, but rather to analyze the work through its structure, its architecture, its intrinsic form, and the play of its internal relationships. At this point, however, a problem arises: What is a work? What is this curious unity which we designate as a work? Of what elements is it composed? Is it not what an author has written? Difficulties appear immediately. If an individual were not an author, could we say that what he wrote, said, left behind in his papers, or what has been collected of his remarks, could be called a "work"? When Sade was not considered an author, what was the status of his papers? Simply rolls of paper onto which he ceaselessly uncoiled his fantasies during his imprisonment.
It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings this disappearance uncovers.
Modern literary criticism, even when—as is now customary—it is not concerned with questions of authentication, still defines the author in much the same way: the author provides the basis for explaining not only the presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and diverse modifications (through his biography, the determination of his individual perspective, the analysis of his social position, and the revelation of his basic design). The author is also the principle of a certain unity of writing—all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by the principles of evolution, maturation, or influence. The author also serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts: there must be—at a certain level of his thought or desire, of his consciousness or unconscious —a point where contradictions are resolved, where incompatible elements are at last tied together or organized around a fundamental or originating contradiction. [...]
Second, there are reasons dealing with the "ideological" status of the author. The question then becomes: How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world? The answer is: One can reduce it with the author. The author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of signification within a world where one is thrifty not only with one's resources and riches but also with one's discourses and their signification. The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning. As a result, we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of the author. We are accustomed, as we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of signification. We are used to thinking that the author is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely.
The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of signification that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inverts it, one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.
“We don’t plan to lose money,” the Shell analyst told me. When I met him, he was a young man, still completing his transition from geoscientist to bean counter. We talked over drinks as he explained how he ended up working at the multinational oil conglomerate—Shell acquired the small firm where he’d been a researcher—and how he hoped that switching to the energy industry’s finance side would provide job security as the oil and gas sector contracted. His role involved analyzing what kind of return Shell could expect from new wells if and when the company is compelled to relinquish them by climate restrictions. Of course, the wells would not then shut down. Rather, the analyst explained, they’d be sold to shadier operators who would continue to pump the wells at lower costs by evading safety and environmental regulations. The firm is incapable of aspiring to abandon its assets; as the analyst said, “We don’t plan to lose money.”
It’s easy to see how individuals are recruited—volunteer themselves, even—into projects that are hostile to their own existence.vii After all, every worker already does the same thing by definition, to a certain degree. Think back to the Shell example. No one wants to work at an underregulated oil field that’s flaring ten million cubic feet of gas every week. Nor would people choose to live in the world that kind of activity is rapidly creating, not if they got to pick. But if that’s workers’ only or even best way to fit into the social metabolism, to access the mediations between themselves and the world that make life possible, we know they’ll take it. They don’t have much of a choice. All the players are then compelled to cooperate: Shell needs to sell the field; the new operator needs to start flaring; and the workers need to operate it the way they’re told to. This doesn’t require us to think of humans as utility-maximizing automatons; the individuals involved could find themselves overcome with moral qualms and quit—people do it all the time. But that protest presents itself to the system as a personnel problem, not a structural challenge, and such personnel problems mostly solve themselves.
If Shell isn’t willing to plan to lose money, should we expect the Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad to behave differently? The largest economies hope not, because they’ve continued investing tens of billions of dollars a year to finance oil and gas projects in poor nations.25 It’s nonsensical to blame the workers of Chad for the climate crisis—they rank among the least culpable people in the world, consuming fewer fossil fuels per person than the citizens of almost any other country on earth—yet their vulnerability puts the whole world at risk. That is the consequence of operating our social metabolism according to value production. It’s no one’s fault, not in particular. We all have to make a living, and these impersonal forces dictate which lives are worth it. Good luck trying to live one that’s not.
And yet the number of global private flights was at an all-time high in 2022—5.4 million.26 Of these, an 85 percent supermajority are private flights within the United States, jaunts of climate-destroying, carbon-intensive convenience taken by the American 1 percent, making up around one-sixth of total domestic air travel.27 But even if the numbers weren’t dramatic, and even if air travel weren’t a stubbornly unelectrifiable source of fossil fuel consumption, I think there’d be something worthwhile about challenging private jet usage just on principle. A marketcrafting strategy has to maintain credibility with the public, and that means the state has to show itself willing and able to protect public interests from its partners in the capitalist class. Private jet owners are a perfect target.